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Abstract:  This paper describes a new representation that enables rigorous definition and 
decomposition of both nominal and off-nominal system goals and functions: the Goal-Function 
Tree (GFT). GFTs extend the concept and process of functional decomposition, utilizing state 
variables as a key mechanism to ensure physical and logical consistency and completeness of the 
decomposition of goals (requirements) and functions, and enabling full and complete traceabilitiy 
to the design. The GFT also provides for means to define and represent off-nominal goals and 
functions that are activated when the system’s nominal goals are not met. The physical accuracy of 
the GFT, and its ability to represent both nominal and off-nominal goals enable the GFT to be 
used for various analyses of the system, including assessments of the completeness and 
traceability of system goals and functions, the coverage of fault management failure detections, 
and definition of system failure scenarios. 
I. Introduction 
YSTEMS engineering (SE) as currently practiced has a number of significant shortcomings. Many current SE 
methods and practices, such as development of requirements and specification of interfaces, are primarily based 
on natural language. For example, requirements traces attempt to connect individual requirements from semi-
structured lists to each other, but this is hampered by the fact that they link inherently ambiguous natural language 
statements using individual judgment to determine the appropriate connections between them. It is thus difficult if 
not impossible to determine if the requirements specified for the system are complete, or to determine the accuracy 
of the relationships between them. Natural language ambiguities also make it difficult to map from requirements to 
functions, and functions to designs. Another problem with current SE is that to the extent it recognizes off-nominal 
perspectives at all; it poorly integrates nominal to off-nominal functions, goals, and designs. This problem can be 
stated in fairly simple terms: for each nominal goal or requirement to be achieved (in this paper we will consider the 
words “goal”, “requirement”, and “objective” to be synonyms), there is the possibility that this goal will not be 
achieved. In this situation, which is usually called “failure”, what should the system to do? If the system is to predict 
or detect failure and then perform some action to prevent or mitigate the failure, then the system now has new off-
nominal goals and associated functions, which we will identify as “fault management” (FM). In turn, FM is the 
operational subset of “system health management” (SHM) which is the set of system capabilities put in place to 
ensure that the system meets its intended goals. 
A number of techniques to improve systems engineering move away from natural language and instead use 
models, under the rubric of “Model-Based Systems Engineering” (MBSE). Other efforts are ongoing to develop 
SHM and FM as the “dark side” of SE.1 This paper will describe a new model-based representation, known as the 
Goal-Function Tree (GFT), which provides significant improvements over current SE practice by integrating 
nominal and off-nominal perspectives, and providing rigor to the classical notion of the functional decomposition. 
The GFT representation, as its name implies, is not merely a functional decomposition, because it inherently 
integrates goals (requirements) and functions together. The GFT representation and its corresponding development 
methodology provides a means to represent, decompose, and elaborate system goals and functions in a rigorous 
manner that connects directly to design through use of state variables, which also enable translation of natural 
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language requirements and goals into logical-physical state language. The state variable-based approach also 
provides the means to directly connect FM to the design, by specifying the range in which state variables must be 
controlled to achieve goals, and conversely, the failures that exist if system behavior go out of range. This in turn 
allows for the systems engineers and SHM/FM engineers to determine which state variables to monitor, and what 
action(s) to take should the system fail to achieve that goal. In sum, the GFT representation provides a unified 
approach to early-phase SE and FM development.  
This representation and methodology has been successfully developed and implemented using Systems 
Modeling Language (SysML) on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Space Launch System 
(SLS) Program. It enabled early design trade studies of failure detection coverage to ensure detection of all failure 
scenarios that can threaten the crew. The representation maps directly both to FM algorithm identification and to 
failure scenario definitions needed for design analysis and testing. The GFT representation provided a basis for 
mapping of abort triggers into scenarios, both needed for initial and successful quantitative analyses of abort 
effectiveness (detection and response to crew-threatening events). 
Section II explains the utility of tree-like, hierarchical models in systems engineering, whose value is typically 
taken as a given. This section also describes some earlier attempts to create success-space models. Section III 
describes the motivations, problems and issues that inspired the development of the GFT on the SLS Program, and 
further issues and problems with systems engineering that it is well-suited to address and improve over standard 
practice. The details of the GFT representation and the methodology to construct a GFT model for a given system 
are presented in Section IV. Section V describes how the GFT is and can be used for a variety of analytical purposes 
for SE, SHM, and FM. 
II. Tree Models and Intentionality 
Success-space, hierarchical models have been researched and occasionally used in systems engineering for 
several decades. Despite this, their utility and purposes have not been universally accepted as part of the standard 
systems engineering process. We will describe in this section several approaches to develop top-down hierarchical 
representations along with some of the uses of these representations. Lastly, to understand why hierarchical models 
are important, but have some significant limitations, we must explore what these hierarchical models actually 
represent, given that a system design is at best only partially hierarchical. 
The most common form of a success-space decomposition is the traditional functional decomposition. In it, the 
systems engineer attempts to define the functions of the system, usually in natural language, and arrange these 
functions into a top-down, inverted tree structure with the root (or perhaps the trunk) at the top and the branches 
below. In general, the top function or functions represent the overall activity that the system is to perform. This top 
function is then decomposed into other functions that must be provided for the top level function to successfully 
occur, and so on as the tree is developed further into many levels. The typical use of this decomposition is to 
determine the functions and the corresponding requirements needed to ensure these functions are provided. 
The tree structure is useful as a method to trace system functions and requirements in an attempt to ensure 
completeness. However, it is difficult to be sure that the functions and related requirements developed in this way 
are complete, mainly due to the problems of interpreting natural language. Requirement trace and function trace 
tools provide means to track the tree structure and traceability, but the inherent difficulty lies in the interpretation of 
natural language, so as to know whether the trace is technically legitimate. The trace tools merely enable traces to be 
tracked and searched once the modeler decides that one requirement traces to another. The validity of that decision 
is not addressed. Note that the typical functional decomposition is distinct but somewhat ambiguously related to 
trace of its corresponding requirements, with the normal assumption being that there should be a requirement 
associated with each function. In systems engineering today, functional decompositions are often given lip service, 
but in practice they are not used consistently, implying that they do not always provide enough value to merit 
standard and consistent implementation. 
Hierarchical decompositions are also used, and perhaps more frequently and consistently, in failure space models 
usually described as “fault trees.” Unlike success trees, fault trees attempt to determine how the system may fail, 
starting from the top level functions that the system must achieve and specifying how the system might fail to 
perform its highest-level function. These failure types are then decomposed further into lower level failures, once 
again leading to an inverted tree structure. Eventually the fault tree can be developed all the way down to the failure 
modes as described in a typical failure modes and effects analysis (which itself is a matrix). In practice a tree 
developed all the way to the failure modes becomes overwhelmingly large and hence the trees are not typically 
developed to this level of detail. As with success space representations, the ways in which functions can fail are 
described in natural language, though the trees can be associated with logical and mathematical attributes to enable 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
 
3
probabilistic and logical operations on the fault tree model. However, the validity of these logical and mathematical 
operations depends at least in part on whether the “failure functions” in fact have the assumed tree-like relationships, 
which in turn depends on proper interpretation of the natural language descriptors. Fault trees have a long track 
record of use and success, ensuring that they are used more consistently for the design of highly reliable systems 
than success space functional decomposition. 
Significant research in success space hierarchical methods has focused on goals. A recent goal methodology is 
described in van Lamsweerde’s book, Requirements Engineering: From System Goals to UML Models to Software 
Specifications.2 As implied by the title of the book, van Lamsweerde views goals as being directly related to 
requirements. Van Lamsweerde believes that goal tree specification using “goal diagrams” is essential, and that it is 
effective to use formal models in Unified Modeling Language (UML) to represent these goals. Conversely to the 
fault tree structures that use OR gate structures for the basic logic of the fault tree, with AND gates to model 
redundancy, in success space van Lamsweerde uses AND gate structures, with OR-gate modifications for 
redundancy. Van Lamsweerde’s work emphasizes the utility of goal tree structures to understand and model 
requirements for complex systems controlled by software, so as to rigorously specify software requirements and link 
them to other UML software design models. Van Lamsweerde correctly notes that tree structures for representation 
of goals is common in artificial intelligence, going back at least to (Nilsson 1971).3 Its introduction into 
requirements engineering, according to van Lamsweerde, came with the work of (Dardenne et al., 1991)4 and 
(Mylopoulos et al., 1992).5 
This link to artificial intelligence is clear in the work of Kim and Modarres (1986),6 who introduced a Goal Tree-
Success Tree representation for use in operator advisory systems. This approach developed in the mid-1980s for 
nuclear power systems modeling, and was tied to expert system development, which in turn is part of the artificial 
intelligence research tradition. For Modarres, the goal tree portion represented the top-level goals, and the success 
tree accounted for lower level goals that needed to be accomplished for the higher level goals to be achieved. It too 
used an AND-gate structure as primary, with OR-gates for alternative methods to achieve a goal. In the advisory 
system application, achievement of success of lower level goals (the lower level “success trees”) was required to 
achieve high-level goals. Modarres (1999)7 continued to develop the GTST approach, creating “master logic 
diagrams” of top level goals as columns and “support functions” as rows to begin assessing how failures affected 
goals. This approach developed into a highly complex methodology and model. Its application to other systems 
seems to have been quite limited. However, it does point to the difficult but critical issue of mapping from goals and 
functions to design, which is a many-to-many complex problem. 
Another goal-tree-related development is the state analysis and Mission Data System (MDS) under development 
at Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL). Ingham et al. (2005)8 provides a description of this approach. The JPL work uses 
a state-based approach to develop an autonomous, on-board deep space computing architecture. This architecture 
employs a goal-tree-like structure to represent goals, for the same reasons that artificial intelligence applications use 
tree structured search spaces. Fragments of the tree can be shifted around based on changes to the vehicle 
configuration, representing changes to the mechanisms needed to operate system functionality. A separate set of 
models represents system constraints. As a state-based approach, the JPL representations utilize state variables as a 
key aspect of their models, which aim toward an operational, deep-space architecture. 
Each of these approaches provide important clues as to the various attributes that can and/or should be modeled 
to provide benefits for systems engineering and fault management. Standard functional decompositions have a 
potentially useful relationship to problems of requirements completeness and traceability. Fault trees attempt to 
develop near-complete representations of failures in safety-critical systems, and quantitative methods and tools have 
been developed to further their utility. Formal modeling methods to represent goals have been developed to create 
more complete and higher quality requirements for software systems, and to support the development of expert 
systems in safety critical applications. When linked to state-based methods and artificial intelligence techniques, 
JPL’s methods attempt to apply goal tree models to deep-space autonomous architectures. The GFT method 
described in this paper utilizes aspects of each of these techniques, but then integrates and applies them to systems 
engineering and fault management. 
Unstated, but underlying all of these methods is a fundamental question: what do hierarchical structures, whether 
in success space or failure space, actually represent? After all, unless the designer is building an artificial tree, a tree 
structure does not match the actual system design. For systems in general, components link to each other in all kinds 
of ways, including feedback loops that do not divide cleanly into independent, separate branches. Put another way, 
what makes some goals and functions more important than others, such that other goals and functions merely 
support these “important” goals and functions? 
What gives some goals and functions a “higher importance” than others is the intention of the designer or 
operator. Engineered systems exist to fulfill some purpose, whose intent is specified originally by the system 
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designers, and later on by the system operators or users, who may decide to use the system differently from the 
designers. It is intentionality that creates hierarchy among the system’s goals and functions. For example, the 
primary purpose of a launch vehicle such as the SLS is to transport a functioning payload of a certain volume and 
mass to a destination in space. This describes a primary set of goals, such as the specific destinations the launch 
vehicle is capable of providing to payloads of the relevant size and mass, and primary functions, which are the 
corresponding transport activities or operations the launch vehicle must perform to move the payload from Earth to 
its destination. All other goals and functions exist to support these primary goals and functions. In the actual design, 
the control of the vehicle’s accelerations, velocities, positions, and attitudes are achieved by control loops, which are 
enabled by further open or closed loop control of power, computing, fluids and so on. In the design representation, 
all of these loops, components and structures are connected in complex ways that have little resemblance to a tree. 
Intention is what enables the flat, interconnected design to be fruitfully represented and analyzed as a hierarchy, 
even when the design is only partially hierarchical. 
III. Motivations for the GFT 
The GFT originated from concrete FM analytical and design problems that arose on NASA’s Ares I launch 
vehicle project during its development from 2006-2011. One key problem was attempting to determine whether the 
abort detections (called “abort triggers”) on Ares I actually detected all Ares I failures that threatened the crew, 
which was in the Orion crew capsule on top of Ares I. Another problem was determining the physical and logical 
relationship between the various abort conditions and triggers. Abort conditions are vehicle failure behaviors, which 
if they occur, would immediately or ultimately threaten the crew through their “downstream” failure effects. In most 
cases, failures produce a variety of effects, and in many cases, two or more abort conditions and triggers could be 
activated in a single failure scenario (one particular failure occurring, leading to many downstream failure effects). 
The design question was whether some abort triggers (detections) were superfluous, because the relevant failure 
effects (abort conditions) were already being detected by other abort triggers. In essence, the question is if there 
were gaps and/or overlaps in the detection coverage of crew-threatening launch vehicle failures. Lastly, were there 
any missing abort conditions? A common theme among the first three items (abort trigger detection coverage, 
physical and logical relationships of abort conditions, and potential missing abort conditions) is that they cannot be 
resolved using “bottom up” approaches. 
On Ares I, candidate abort conditions were generated using engineering judgment and documented as a list 
containing the conditions and a variety of condition attributes. As the list was developed, a number of issues arose, 
which the FM team had great difficulty in addressing. One particularly troublesome issue was trying to determine 
what was meant by a “monitored condition”. Some conditions were potentially monitored “at” the location of the 
abort condition, such as a Thrust Vector Control (TVC) Hardover abort condition, monitored by direct measurement 
of the gimbal angles. This condition was ultimately classified to be “non-monitored”. This was because the gimbal 
angle position sensors were of insufficient criticality, meaning it would have been costly to upgrade them and add 
more sensors, and because failure effects of a TVC gimbal hardover would be visible and adequately monitored and 
detected by the Guidance, Navigation, and Control Abort Triggers: attitude error and attitude rate error in this case. 
These attitude and rate triggers were “causally downstream” from the gimbal position. A good case could be made 
that this meant the condition was actually monitored, though not directly. 
This case was only one of many examples showing the existence of a physical, causal relationship between abort 
conditions, but in list form it was difficult to determine these relationships in a consistent and complete way. If there 
was more than one way to monitor an abort condition, how does one identify the several possible abort triggers that 
could monitor the condition, and determine which of these triggers should be implemented? If more than one trigger 
was implemented, is unneeded system complexity being created, adding to cost and perhaps decreasing reliability? 
Does monitoring mean “directly monitored” as opposed to “indirectly monitored”, and if so, can one define more 
precisely what “directly monitored” means? Finally, could the relevant analysis be done early enough in the design 
process to select and develop the relevant hardware and software in a cost efficient manner? 
The same kinds of problems arose on the SLS program as it began after the cancellation of Ares I and 
Constellation. To address these problem, a new analytical method and approach was needed. This is the genesis of 
the GFT (which on SLS is called the Goal Tree / Success Tree (GTST)). It was hypothesized that a top-down 
approach in success space may be able to address these questions. Unlike failure space, in success space it does not 
matter how a system goal is not achieved, and hence the analyst can ignore the specific failure modes that can cause 
failure of the goal. It matters only that the goal is not being achieved, because if the goal is not achieved, then 
higher-level goals will also be compromised, ultimately compromising the system’s ultimate purpose(s). Given that 
one of the major problems with SHM and FM is the impossibility of identifying all possible causes of failure, a 
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independent functions. This is the correct model to represent the flow of actual physical operations in time. Figures 
4 and 5 shows these two distinct ways to represent control loop functions in a tree hierarchy, with only the series 
representation being physically correct. For our purposes, correct physical causality is an essential property of the 
GFT, not just probabilistic and/or logical consistency. 
D. Tree Fragment Replication: Similar but Distinct Requirements 
Another feature of tree representations in general is the fact that some tree fragments are replicated in several 
locations, because these fragments represent a common set of functions that support several other functions. These 
fragments appear in different parts of the tree. The GFT also shares this feature, but with its state variable 
formulation, it distinguishes subtle but important differences between these otherwise identical tree fragments. With 
a human-rated launch vehicle, for example, accelerations must be controlled for several different reasons: to prevent 
breakage of the launch vehicle structure, to prevent breakage of the crew vehicle structure, and to prevent damage to 
the humans in the crew vehicle. The fact that accelerations must be limited shows up in three different locations in 
the GFT, and with acceleration state variables. Their appearance in three different locations indicates that these are 
really three different requirements, which in the GFT appear as three distinct ranges associated with the output 
acceleration state vector that appears in the three different locations in the tree. These must be tracked and traced as 
three distinct goals; that is, three distinct requirements. 
E. Goal Types 
It is often convenient to differentiate different kinds of nominal goals. For example, in the SLS GFT, it was 
found useful to define three nominal goal types: achievement, maintenance, and prevention. Achievement goals 
represented requirements to achieve a specific objective at a single point in time, such as attaining the appropriate 
altitude at the end of the first stage burn. Maintenance goals, on the other hand, are goals that must be maintained 
over long periods of time so as to attain an achievement goal. So in the first stage achievement goal just mentioned, 
the launcher must provide thrust and attitude control from the moment it lifts off the ground until it reaches the end 
of the first stage burn in preparation for first stage separation. Prevention goals are requirements to prevent 
something from happening. In the same case described above, separation of the first stage from the second stage 
must be prevented prior to the appropriate separation time. This leads to specific functions such as command inhibits 
and lockouts to prevent premature separation. 
F. Requirements Capture, Completeness and Traceability 
A typical feature of systems engineering work is the capture and traceability of requirements. The GFT improves 
this process in four important ways. The first is its identification of requirements as the control of the ranges of the 
output state variables of system functions. This precise manner of goal / requirement specification enables the 
translation of natural language requirements into a precise mathematical, physical, logical language. A second 
significant improvement is that the GFT’s state variable methodology provides a much more structured and rigorous 
way of ensuring that the goals generated at each level of the tree are a complete representation of the state space that 
must be provided as inputs to functions so as to enable the control of the output state variables within their nominal 
ranges. This methodology enables a much better chance that the system engineers will determine a complete or near-
complete set of requirements for GFT-modeled functions. A third significant improvement over typical systems 
engineering practice is that the GFT inherently creates a hierarchy of goals and requirements through its very 
construction, not just a hierarchy of functions as with a classical function decomposition. Finally, that same 
hierarchical structure means that requirement traceability is inherent in the GFT model. It is no longer a guessing 
game as to which requirements decompose into other requirements. In terms of physical relationships, functions, and 
requirements tied to these relationships, the hierarchy and traceability is guaranteed within the representation itself. 
However, it is not obvious whether the functional hierarchy and physical relationships specified by the GFT are 
the “right kind” of hierarchy desired by the systems engineers or program managers. This is because the 
requirements decomposition that they desire is based not on function, but on the organizational and institutional 
structure of the project. Because organizations build the system’s components, it is usually true that the interfaces 
between components are also the interface between organizations. Requirements must generally be specified at the 
interfaces between components, and hence at the interfaces between organizations. It therefore appears that there are 
at least two or three distinct kinds of hierarchical representations that are of relevance to systems engineering. The 
issue of how the GFT maps to the design components, and how these components relate to organizations, becomes 
important. This paper will address the former in the next subsection, but will not attempt to address the latter; this is 
a topic for future research. 
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G. Mapping of Requirements and Functions to Design 
Functions describe the operations or physical transformations (which, as described earlier, can be passive or 
active) that the system must perform to achieve its objectives. The design describes the means by which these 
physical operations and transformations are achieved. Using the GFT to describe the system’s goals and functions, 
the mapping to the design is based on the state variables and the entities being controlled, which are common to 
both. Mapping from the GFT to the design is merely a case of searching the GFT and the design for the common 
entities and the state variable attributes of those entities that must be controlled. The mapping simply links the 
common entities and state variables from the design model to the GFT and vice versa. 
In success and fault trees, the same or closely related functions are identified in many locations of the tree. Thus, 
in a launch vehicle, for example, “thrust vector control functions” appear in several locations to control attitude so as 
to facilitate proper trajectory, to ensure structural integrity, control structural temperatures, and to protect payload 
integrity or human safety. These are repeated in several major tree branches because these same functions are 
necessary for several system activities. Thus the thrust vector state variables appear tens of times in the overall 
success tree, but these all map to the same mechanism that performs these functions. It is also true that several 
mechanisms could map to the same function. There is in general a many-to-many mapping from a GFT to the 
corresponding system design. 
One of the major reasons for developing a functional model is to determine what the system must do (its 
functions), with some independence from how the system will perform the function. This enables problems to be 
encapsulated, to enable trade studies of different methods and designs to perform the function. Within a GFT, the 
more precise definition of functions implies that the input and output state variables should be the same for all 
design options to perofrm the function. To enable a trade study for the function, the GFT modeler needs to consider 
the proper level of granularity for the function. As an example, consider a trade study of the potential use of reaction 
wheels or thrusters to perform spacecraft attitude control, that is, to provide rotational force. To set up the trade 
study, the function boundaries should be set with common inputs and outputs for both alternatives as much as 
possible. In this case, the output state vector is the rotational force vector, and a common input state vector, which 
would include electrical power for the actuator (whether reaction wheels or thruster valves), and the desired amount 
of rotational correction. In the case of thrusters, this would command a certain amount of thrusting, and for reaction 
wheels, a command to accelerate or decelerate the relevant wheels. Assuming that propellant is necessary for 
spacecraft trajectory maneuvers already, propellant would be necessary as an input for thrusters. The trade study 
would, among other things, have to determine if this would need to be added as an input to the rotation function. 
H. Fault Management Goals / Requirements 
Fault management comes into play in the GFT by the identification of off-nominal goals to be achieved should a 
nominal goal not be achieved. For every nominal goal, there is the possibility that the goal is not achieved, which 
simply means that the values of the state variables of the entity being controlled (i.e. the output state vector of the 
function), either are deviating, or are predicted to deviate out of range. Deviation out of nominal range is a failure, 
whereas prediction that deviation out of nominal range will occur in the future, based on a degradation occurring 
now, is a prognostication. If the systems engineer decides that nothing will be done if that state variable(s) goes out 
of range, then there is no off-nominal requirement at that location. If something will be done based on an estimate or 
measurement of that state variable(s), then an off-nominal goal is placed at that “monitored state variable” location. 
The off-nominal goal can be of two distinct types insofar as the GFT is concerned. The first type is that the goal 
of the fault management is to maintain the current set of nominal goals for the system, such as a message that simply 
notifies a system operator that a problem exists, without actually taking any action to change the system’s nominal 
functions. Another example is when a failure is produced from an external cause, and the system is able to fix the 
failure effects without having to change system goals. Because the failure was caused from an external event such as 
wind or cosmic rays that produce Single Event Upsets that flip software bits, if the system can detect and respond 
appropriately the mission may be able to continue. Examples of appropriate responses would be temporary 
activation of a different control algorithm to maintain control, or use of error detection and correction (EDAC) code 
to flip changed bits back to their correct state. 
The second type is when the off-nominal action changes the system’s nominal functions. In general, these 
actions produce goals and functions that differ from the nominal GFT, because by definition, new, off-nominal 
functions are activated. Once activated, these new functions produce new required system behaviors, and these mean 
that there is a new and different GFT to represent that new set of required goals and functions. In general, because 
the off-nominal functions use parts of the existing nominal functions (and corresponding designs), parts of the 
existing nominal GFT are used in the new off-nominal GFT. Thus the new GFT is an amalgamation of parts of the 
old GFT, typically re-arranged in some manner, and with some new goals and functions that enable this re-
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arrangement. Different systems may choose to create system-specific categories of off-nominal goals, but if they are 
anything other than notifications, they will lead to the creation of new trees or sub-trees to address the off-nominal 
functions. 
This re-arrangement of the GFT for systems engineering purposes can be seen in another, operational light. In 
the development of highly autonomous systems and of mission planners, artificial intelligence (AI) techniques are 
frequently used. These techniques typically include hierarchical tree structures to represent the implementation of 
system goals, which are searched and re-arranged by the AI system as the intentions for the system change as it 
reacts to novel circumstances. The GFT can therefore be seen as the equivalent of the AI planning model of system 
goal priorities, when translated into an operational, autonomous environment. A future research topic is how to 
relate the systems engineering GFT to the autonomous goal structures such as JPL’s Mission Data System, briefly 
mentioned above in section II. 
I. Tree Structure and Causality 
Hierarchical tree structures highlight the causal independence of mutually supporting functions. Returning to the 
structural control described in section B above, in which structures are typically controlled in a passive manner, we 
find that structural integrity for a launch vehicle is controlled both passively and actively. For example, in a launch 
vehicle GFT, one finds that to maintain vehicle attitude (rotational) control, we must maintain structural integrity. 
However, it is also true that if we lose attitude control of the vehicle, we lose structural integrity. For one branch of 
the tree, maintaining vehicle attitude control is a top function, and a supporting function is to maintain structural 
integrity. However in other branches of the tree, maintaining structural integrity is the high level function, and 
maintaining vehicle attitude control is a supporting function! This is not a mistake; these alternative situations 
represent two distinct causal paths of mutually supporting functions (another example, we need power to perform 
computing, but we must compute properly to control power). In the GFT path where maintaining vehicle attitude 
control is the high level function and structural integrity is supporting, a failure of structural integrity will cause loss 
of vehicle control, but not the other way around. In the other branch, where maintaining structural integrity is the top 
function and vehicle attitude control supports it, a failure of vehicle attitude control will create loss of structural 
integrity (that is, the vehicle will break up), but not vice versa. Both paths together capture all possibilities. 
This example shows an important feature of the GFT: its ability to be used for physically accurate analysis. In 
the case described in the previous paragraph, one sees that introducing failures into the system will lead to an 
accurate analysis of the potential outcomes in terms of how they physically and logically propagate to compromise 
system goals. Although this analysis is accurate for what it does model, it does not model all possible failure 
behaviors, as will be described below. 
 
V. Analyses Using the GFT 
The GFT enables a variety of assessments and analyses of the system for both nominal and off-nominal 
purposes. 
A. Nominal Requirement and Function Completeness and Traceability 
The GFT is inherently a top-down hierarchical representation of both goals and functions, with precise 
relationships between them. Both goals and functions are represented in a hierarchical manner, and the state variable 
methodology provides great value in ensuring that as the GFT is constructed from the top down, that the resulting 
goals and functions trace correctly and completely. Functional and goal traceability is guaranteed within the tree 
structure, to the extent that the modelers properly and precisely model those relationships as guided by the state 
variable elucidation of the physics to be controlled. Since goals are requirements, requirements traceability is 
guaranteed by definition. If requirements were developed separately from the GFT, the GFT can be developed as an 
independent check of requirements completeness and traceability. If the GFT was the mechanism for requirements 
development, the structure of the GFT model and the state variable methodology provide strong evidence of 
completeness. For functions, the same logic applies as it does for goals / requirements to assess function 
completeness and traceability. 
However, this happy story is complicated by the fact that a functional decomposition is not the same as an 
institutional decomposition. Because requirements and functions need to be specified at component and institutional 
boundaries, the functional representation of the GFT must be mapped to component (design) and institutional 
hierarchy representations. Determining the proper method to achieve this is future research. 
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B. Failure Detection Coverage 
One of the major questions of FM design is the coverage of failure detections. Historically, to the extent this has 
been addressed in FM design analyses, coverage has been assessed from the bottom up. In this bottom-up 
methodology, design models are built that show the location and relationship of all components (at a relevant level 
of component decomposition), including sensors, and also including the failure modes of the modeled components. 
Diagnostic models using directed graphs are typical examples; one is described in Kurtoglu et al. (2008).10 Failure 
detection coverage is assessed and measured as the number and identity of the failure modes that can be potentially 
detected by a failure detection algorithm that uses a given set of sensors. There are a number of uses for this sort of 
coverage assessment, but one thing that it cannot directly do is to determine whether the failure modes being 
detected are important in terms of the system’s goals. Failure detection coverage is perhaps better assessed by 
whether failure detections “cover”, or detect all possible failures that can lead to compromise of critical system 
goals. In current typical methodologies, failure modes are assigned criticality values that appear in the failure modes, 
effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) matrix. These criticality values represent the result of an informal analysis 
of the propagation of the failure effects to compromise critical goals such as human safety and success. Thus it is in 
theory possible with a complete model of failure modes with assigned criticalities to indirectly assess coverage of 
system goals. Unfortunately, by the time all of these failure modes are known and modeled, if any problems are 
found it is very far along in the design process, making any fixes quite expensive or impossible. 
Another issue is that for any complex system, it is impossible in practice to determine all possible ways in which 
the system to fail. History shows that many system failures that have actually occurred were for a variety of reasons 
not considered or ruled out as extremely improbable. In a few cases, the failure mechanisms were not identified. In 
others, these failure mechanisms were considered, but judged not credible because pre-predicted probabilities of 
failure indicated that the probability of failure occurrence was trivially small, such as cases of multiple coincident 
failures. However the problems nonetheless occurred because the design or manufacturing assumptions behind the 
probabilistic estimate were violated. In yet other cases, the failure mechanism was understood, but the consequences 
underestimated or not understood at all. Any approach that relies purely on identification of failure modes, whether 
from the top down or bottom up, is doomed to failure (pun intended) due to the lack of imagination of the analysts 
and/or the vagaries of how seemingly trivial problems can slip through the nets of testing and analysis and lead to 
system failure. 
A better approach is enabled by the GFT. Failure detection coverage can be directly assessed by determining 
whether there are any paths from the bottom to the top of the tree that do not have at least one failure detection goal 
(and hence a corresponding detection response function) along that path. A quick visual scan, or for large models, 
automated searches can quickly discover any “uncovered paths.” 
One nuance to this rather simple approach is when there exist several locations in the GFT where the same state 
variables exist and are monitored, but with potentially different success (and hence failure) ranges. As described in 
IV.D above, for a launch vehicle, control of acceleration state variables is required to prevent breaking the launcher, 
the crew capsule, and the crew. These state variables each have different ranges, and hence a failure detection to 
monitor for vehicle acceleration could have thresholds based on any of these three possibilities. Only one of them is 
the most stringent range. If this most-stringent range is not selected, then it is possible that a system failure can 
occur without detection because an incorrect, looser range was selected. As an example, if the most stringent range 
is to protect the astronauts, but the acceleration detection instead uses a range that is valid for protecting breakage of 
the launch vehicle, then the safety of the astronauts can be put at risk without the acceleration detection occurring. 
C. Failure Scenario Generation 
Since the GFT is a causally correct representation, it can be used to identify many, though not all failure 
scenarios. We define a failure scenario to be a unique combination of failure effects, failure responses, and system 
configuration and/or time in which the failure occurs. Within the GFT, the failure effects are represented by the 
changes to the values of state variables from the bottom of the tree as functions perform incorrectly along the failure 
effect path (which corresponds to the nominal path) up the tree. If the failure can be contained, it will be stopped at a 
certain location along this path. Otherwise it will continue to proceed up to the top of the tree, compromising the 
system’s primary goal(s). Every path up the tree corresponds to a unique set of failure effects. Potentially different 
responses are shown by the existence of one or more failure detections (which then link to different responses) along 
that path. Different mission times and configurations are represented by the existence of several sub-trees in the 
GFT, each sub-tree representing a unique system configuration and/or time (these create different tree structures). In 
short, each path up the tree is directly tied to a set of failure scenarios. 
Because each path of the tree shows the state variables being affected by the failure effects, it gives important 
clues about the inherent physics and hence to the timing of the spread of failure effects. Different kinds of physics 
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imply different characteristic times by which the physics propagates. For example, radio signals propagate near the 
speed of light, while fluid flows propagate much more slowly. Failure effects propagate at the rate dictated by the 
physics of that propagation. These timing effects are of relevance to analyzing the effectiveness of potential failure 
responses, as these must operate more quickly than the spread of the failure effects. 
However, these GFT-defined scenarios do not define the total set of failure scenarios. This is because a GFT, as 
a success-space representation, can only represent the system’s nominal causal connectivity. If a failure creates new 
connections between functionss, new failure paths that do not follow the system’s nominal paths, then the GFT 
cannot and does not represent these new paths. It is in fact true that some failures create new failure paths, which in 
the GFT represent “sneak paths” from one part of the tree to another independent set of branches. Examples of these 
include electrical short circuits and breaks of the physical structure from fires and explosions. 
The implication of this is that fault trees and success trees for a given system are NOT complete logical 
complements of each other, though parts of the respective trees are. Both success trees and fault trees provide value 
for systems engineers and system health management engineers, but for different kinds of analyses. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The GFT model, with its rigorous state variable-based methodology, extends the concept and methodology of the 
standard systems engineering functional decomposition, and makes it physically and causally valid. This enables it 
to be used for a variety of analytical uses and significantly improves the quality, comprehensiveness, and traceability 
of both nominal and off-nominal requirements generation and maintenance. This utility has been demonstrated on 
the NASA Space Launch System Program, providing significant value in the design and assessment of Fault 
Management for this human-rated launch vehicle. The model and associated methodology enable direct analysis of 
FM detection coverage of various combinations of abort triggers, the mapping of various failure detections to failure 
scenarios, and enabled early assessments of expected failure response effectiveness. 
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What is a GFT?
A top-down hierarchical decomposition of system goals and 
functions --- hierarchies are models of “intention”
 Arranged by major system phase/configuration, 
 Defines the functions the system must perform and goals the system must 
achieve for the system to successfully perform its mission/objectives
 Relationship between goals and functions defined through rigorous use of 
state variables
The GFT extends the classical function decomposition through the 
use of state variables to explicitly contain goals, and makes the 
GFT causally, physically correct
 It is based on function, not design, though inherently you must
make some design assumptions
 Example:  Goal is to place humans into trans-lunar trajectory
 Two possible solutions:
 Star Trek-style quantum transporter
 Space Launch System-style chemical rocket
 These two solutions yield very different function decompositions, SLS 
has stages, the transporter does not, etc.
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State Variable Methodology
State variables are defined as inputs and 
outputs to functions:  y=f(x)
 x = inputs to the functions f
 f transforms the inputs into the outputs y
Goals = Requirements = define intended 
range of the output state variables y
Failure = state (value) of output state 
variable y is out of intended range
State variables enforce strong connection 
of the functional decomposition to the 
system’s physical laws and causation
The state variables are the connection 
between function and design—exist in both 
function and design representations
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Function f
࢞૜࢞૛࢞૚
࢟
→
ܴ௟ ≤ ࢟ ≤ ܴ௛  G
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Off-Nominal Goals
 For every nominal goal there is the possibility of an off-nominal goal, 
which is activated if the nominal goal is not achieved
 Value (state) of state vector y goes out of intended range
 If a new off-nominal goal is identified, this is an operational Fault 
Management goal, with associated off-nominal functions to detect or 
predict failure, and respond
4
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Function f
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Elaboration vs. Decomposition
Decomposition merely re-arranges a state vector’s variables into 
several state vectors containing the same variables
 No function exists
Elaboration creates new variables via a function
5
Generate Thrust
݉ைଶ
ைܶଶ
ைܲଶ
࢟ = {ݔଵ, ݔଶ, ݔଷ, ݒଵ, ݒଶ, ݒଷ, ܽଵ, ܽଶ, ܽଷ}
ுܲଶ
ுܶଶ
݉ுଶ
F
࢞ = {ݔଵ, ݔଶ, ݔଷ}
࢜ = {ݒଵ, ݒଶ, ݒଷ}
Elaboration Decomposition
ࢇ = {ܽଵ, ܽଶ, ܽଷ}
19 August 2013 Dependable System Technologies, LLC
Local Motivation for the GFT
 NASA Space Launch System – Fault Management Analytical Issues
 Does SLS detect failures properly in all SLS-caused failure scenarios that 
threaten the crew?  [i.e.: failure detection coverage and failure scenario 
definition]
 What is the relationship of crew-threatening behaviors to each other, to 
system goals, and to potential detections?
 What is the optimal distribution of FM detections and responses?
 For a complex system, it is impossible to determine all possible ways the 
system can go wrong, but we can and should be able to specify completely 
what must go “right”!
 Need to base SHM/FM design in part on protecting the functions needed to succeed, 
regardless of how they might fail
 Early in a program, detailed design and related FMEAs do not exist, but 
need to start FM early in design phase
 This must be a top-down analysis based on goals and intended functions, not just on 
design (SLS is only partly heritage)
6
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Modeling for Logic and Causality in a 
Control Loop
Sense Decide Respond
Decide
Sense
Respond
Control
Control
We require the GFT to be causally correct, not merely logically correct.
The State Variable methodology FORCES the model to be causally correct, 
and hence it can be used for physical analyses of many kinds!!
In both constructions, the basic logic and related 
probabilities of success are correct, because S-D-
R all must succeed for Control to succeed. 
However, only the serial model is physically-
causally correct, because if S fails, then D and R 
will both fail.  S, D, and R, are NOT logically 
independent!
Typical, but wrong!
Physically 
and logically 
correct; 
causation is 
correctly 
modeled.
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Ascent/Abort GFT Example
Perform
BS 
Ascent
Deliver to 
Destination
Keep 
crew 
alive
Control
Trajectory
Control
Attitude
keep 
capsule 
intact
limit 
forces 
on 
crew
provide 
life 
support
control 
structural 
temp
control 
structural 
loads
provide 
desired
Pos/Vel
Measure 
actual 
Pos/Vel
Control Error
Between
Desired & 
Measured Pos/Vel
X, V
X, V
Crew A P, Cabin T, O2 Capsule A,
Capsule Struc T
Capsule Struc T
Des X
Des V
Meas X
Meas V
X Err
V Err
Capsule A
A, Cabin T, O2, Θdot
Θ
Control Crew
Roll Rate
Abort
Maintain 
Struc
Integrity
Nominal 
control
Control
Structure
Defects
Control
LV Struc
Loads
Abort
Abort
Control
LV Struc
Temps
Θdot
LV Struc A LV Struc T
Struc Crack
Size, Alloy
Purity
Control
Attitude
Error
Θ Err
Separate
BS-CS
Core Ascent Perform
US Ascent
Mainstage
y = f (x)
x
f
y
Functioning 
Crew 
reaches 
Orbit
X, V, Θdot, A, Struc T, Cabin 
T, O2 
Ignite
BS
Ignite CS 
Engines
A, LV Struc T
X, V, Θdot, A, Struc T, Cabin T, O2 
X, V, Θdot, A, Struc T, Cabin T, O2 LV “Ready”, Struc T, Cabin T, O2 
Θdot
Abort
Abort = New Goal, with 
new functions leading to 
new GFTs
Trajectory 
Trigger Attitude Trigger
Θ Err
X Err, V Err
Roll
Trigger
Θdot
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GFT Analysis:  Nominal Requirements 
Generation and Traceability
Every GFT Goal is a system functional requirement.
 A typical functional decomposition is only about functions; the relationship to 
their associated requirements is vague.
 The GFT inherently associates goals to requirements.
All requirements are represented in mathematical-physical 
language, with constraints placed on state variable ranges.
The state variable methodology ensures correct physical 
traceability and connectivity between functional requirements
 Natural language ambiguities make determining traces between natural 
language requirements problematic.  It is easy to miss or misinterpret proper 
traces.
The state variable methodology provides much better evidence of 
requirements completeness than typical natural language 
requirements.
 The physics and logic being required are directly represented.
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Nominal Requirements Traceability and 
Application Issues
Does a functional decomposition, even using a GFT, create the 
“right kind” of traceability needed for systems engineering?
 Issue:  requirements must be specified on interfaces between 
components and hence on organizations, but how do these relate 
to functions and functional requirements as represented in 
classical function decompositions and the GFT?
 Implication: function-based trees in general do NOT easily 
represent the kind of hierarchy desired, which is the institutional / 
component hierarchies in which requirements must be specified 
and levied on organizations to build components.
Future research: building the organizational and component 
hierarchies and relating these to the GFT.
10
19 August 2013 Dependable System Technologies, LLC
GFT Fault Management Analyses #1
Every unique path up the GFT from bottom to top is a failure 
scenario
 Though this does not generate all possible failure scenarios
 GFT paths are only nominal paths, but failures can create new off-nominal
paths, such as structure breakage or electrical short-circuits
 Scenario definition also requires a fault tree, not just a success tree, but this 
fault tree must be based on the same state variable methodology as the GFT
Failure detection coverage is determined by identifying all paths 
that have at least one failure detection along the path, and 
conversely for any non-covered paths
 Nuance: when the same state variable exists in more than one GFT location, 
it indicates a different requirement / range constraint levied on the same 
state variable: example---acceleration constrained by need to protect the 
crew, the crew capsule structure, and the launch vehicle structure
 When this occurs, it is possible that the threshold values set for the failure 
detection associated with the state variable can be set to the wrong value; it 
needs to be set to the tightest requirement
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GFT FM Analysis #2
Optimization of failure detection & response based on the 
distribution and relationship of failure detections along GFT paths
 At least one failure detection should exist along every GFT path
 When more than one failure detection exists along a GFT path, then there is 
redundant detection for a given scenario.  These could indicate excess 
redundancy, and this should be assessed.  It could be that the detections are 
needed to cover other scenarios.
 Failure response effectiveness is based on the race condition of the FM 
response speed compared to the failure effect propagation rate. The latter 
are related to the types of physics indicated by the state variables along the 
GFT paths (note not all failure paths exist in the GFT, see previous page). 
Examples: electrical state variables indicate electron flows with characteristic 
speeds; these differ from pressure and temperature state variables and their 
characteristic times for fluid flows.
 Some paths have failure probabilities higher than other paths.  For these it is 
appropriate to have detections “lower down” in the GFT to make more 
response time available before compromise of high-level goals.
 Identify the “sneak paths” created by off-nominal paths.
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Conclusion
GFTs extend the classical “functional decomposition” to include 
goals (requirements) and state variables
Requirements / goals are translated from natural language into 
constraints on the range of controlled state variables, which in turn 
are the outputs of functions
The rigor applied through state variables ensures the GFT is 
physically and causally valid, and hence can be used for a variety of 
physical analyses for both nominal and off-nominal purposes
 Requirement and function traceability and completeness
 Failure detection coverage and optimization
 Failure scenario generation
The GFT has been successfully applied to the NASA SLS Program, 
and used for off-nominal analysis of abort conditions and 
detections, using SysML as the modeling language
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